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Abstract. The purpose of this note is to establish, in a categorical manner, the
universality of the Geroch-Kronheimer-Penrose causal boundary when considering
the types of causal structures that may profitably be put on any sort of boundary for
a spacetime. Actually, this can only be done for the future causal boundary (or the
past causal boundary) separately; furthermore, only the chronology relation, not the
causality relation, is considered, and the GKP topology is eschewed. The final result
is that there is a unique map, with the proper causal properties, from the future causal
boundary of a spacetime onto any “reasonable” boundary which supports some sort
of chronological structure and which purports to consist of a future completion of
the spacetime. Furthermore, the future causal boundary construction is categorically
unique in this regard.
Section I: Introduction and Discussion
The causal boundary of Geroch, Kronheimer, and Penrose [GKP] (also explicated
in [HE], section 6.8) has played a role in helping to make clear the purely causal
aspects of spacetimes, especially at timelike or null infinity. Being defined in terms
of the pasts and futures of points, it seems to be a “natural” object for focussing
on such matters. However, it has generally been considered somewhat opaque in
application and difficult of calculation. Is it still worth pursuing in spite of its
somewhat formidable reputation? An affirmative answer may be forthcoming if the
intuitive sense of naturalness accruing to the causal boundary can be justified in a
precise and general manner. It is the purpose of this note to do exactly that: to
show that the causal boundary is a “universal object” in the strict categorical sense,
that is to say, that in an appropriate mathematical category, the causal boundary
construction is the essentially unique way of completing a spacetime in such a way
as to yield a model to which any other causal completion process can naturally be
compared (by means of a map from the causal boundary to the other boundary).
However, some caveats are in order: First of all, the categorical constructions
performed here operate only on the future causal boundary (or, alternatively, only
the past causal boundary), not on the melding together of the future and past
boundaries that constitutes one of the more complicated issues in the full Geroch-
Kronheimer-Penrose (GKP) construction. Effectively, this is the portion of the
GKP construction which places an endpoint on each future-endless causal curve in
a spacetime, leaving past endpoints unaccounted for. Correspondingly, the cate-
gorical comparison will be made only with any “reasonable” future completion of a
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spacetime—a completion of all future causal curves only. One way to understand
why this is necessary is by noting that although the future causal boundary com-
pletes all future causal curves, and the past causal boundary completes all past
causal curves, the combination of the two creates additional causal relations which
can result in an object which is no longer complete in either future or past. (An
example is given in the appendix.)
Second, in this presentation, only the chronology relation will be addressed,
not the causality relation; this is more a matter of simplification than anything
else: Categorical results can be obtained by working with only the one relation, so
that is the path followed here, though there is no barrier to including both rela-
tions. Accordingly, the boundary construction here is called the future chronological
boundary, allowing a distinction from the GKP (future) causal boundary.
Finally, all topology is eschewed from the approach here, with notions of con-
vergence being treated by purely chronological means. This allows an enormous
savings of complexity, as well as the avoidance of one of the more difficult elements
of the GKP causal boundary. (A topology can be inferred from the chronological
notion of convergence developed herein, but this will not play an explicit role.)
As a model for the construction followed here, consider the problem of complet-
ing a Riemannian manifold. There is more than one way to do this: One could
take the one-point compactification, the Cauchy completion, or some arbitrary iso-
metric embedding into a complete metric space. Part of the issue is that one is
liable to end up with a non-manifold as one’s complete object: The category of
Riemannian manifolds and differentiable functions is not big enough to contain all
the completions we may wish to consider. So the first thing to do is to expand
to a larger category, the category Met of metric spaces and continuous functions.
We’ll use Cauchy completion as our method of completing not just any Riemannian
manifold, but any metric space at all. This is actually a functor C : Met→Met0
from Met to the subcategory of complete metric spaces, Met0; this means that
not only does each metric space X have a Cauchy completion C(X), but also that
for every map f : X → Y in Met, there is an extension of f to the completions,
C(f) : C(X)→ C(Y ), which works with compositions and with identity maps, i.e.,
C(f ◦g) = C(f)◦C(g) and C(idX) = idC(X). We need to take note not only of the
completion of each metric space X but also of its embedding into its completion,
iX : X → C(X). This is a natural transformation i : IMet →˙ U ◦ C, where
IMet is the identity functor on Met and U : Met0 →Met is the “forgetful” (i.e.,
inclusion) functor; this means that for any map f : X → Y , the embeddings on
X and Y work with the extension to f , i.e., iY ◦ f = C(f) ◦ iX (also, as a natu-
ral transformation, iX is considered as technically mapping X to U(C(X))). The
importance of the Cauchy construction for completion is that it is universal in the
sense of being a left adjoint to the forgetful functor; this means that for any map
from a metric space into a complete metric space, there is a unique extension of
that map to the Cauchy completion: For any X in Met, any Y in Met0, and any
map f : X → U(Y ), there is a unique map f0 : C(X)→ Y such that U(f0)◦iX = f
(more simply, ignoring the forgetful functor: for any f : X → Y with Y complete,
there is a unique f0 : C(X) → Y such that f0 ◦ iX = f). Since left adjoints are
unique up to natural isomorphism (a natural transformation consisting of isomor-
phisms) ([M], Corollary IV.1), this tells us that Cauchy completion is the correct
construction for the “free” completion of a metric space, in exact analogy with the
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free vector space on a set: It is functorial, natural, and universal. (But note that
we had to expand from Riemannian manifolds to the larger setting of metric spaces
in order to obtain a category in which the functoriality of the construction comes
into play.)
The general idea here is to define a category of objects which includes both space-
times and spacetimes that have boundaries attached to them, and to show that the
future chronological boundary is a functorial, natural, and universal construction.
The category, called chronological sets, consists, roughly speaking, of objects that
are spacetime-like in that they possess a relation that works like the chronology
relation in a spacetime. There is a great deal of freedom in choosing which proper-
ties of the spacetime relation to abstract and axiomatize for our new category. The
ones chosen here seem to be the minimum ones needed to carry enough structure
to be able to replace topology as the means for defining convergence for appropri-
ate sequences of points. The approach here is somewhat reminiscent of the causal
spaces axiomatized in [KP], and some of the language (such as “full” and “chain”)
from that paper is borrowed for this one; but there is a great deal of simplification
achieved by concentrating solely on the chronology relation.
What is the practical impact of establishing the universality of the future chrono-
logical boundary? How does this help in understanding spacetimes? The answer
lies in being able to relate any proposed future boundary for a spacetime to what
is essentially the GKP future (pre-)boundary points, in a manner respecting the
chronological relations—so long as the proposed boundary includes an extension
of the chronology relation of the spacetime and does so in a “reasonable” manner
(such as being past-distinguishing). Some examples at this point may help:
First an artificial example: Consider a spacetime M obtained from Minkowski
2-space (L2) by excising a timelike line segment L (such as {(0, t)|0 ≤ t ≤ 1}).
(A closely related example is considered in detail at the end of section IV.) The
most obvious way to put a helpful boundary on M is to embed it back into L2 in
the obvious way, yielding L as the boundary points for M . However, this is not
the only useful possibility. Let us expand our conception of M to include anything
conformal to L2 − L. Then, considering that the metric may become inherently
singular as the points of L are approached, we may wish to choose a boundary
construction that respects L as a physical blockage between its left and right sides;
typically, we may choose as boundary two copies of L, one for the left side and
one for the right side of the slit in M , joined at the top and the bottom, i.e., a
boundary of the form {(0−, t)|0 ≤ t ≤ 1} ∪ {(0+, t)|0 ≤ t ≤ 1}, with (0−, 0) and
(0+, 0) identified, as well as (0−, 1) and (0+, 1). (By “physical blockage” here I refer
to the chronology relation in the spacetime-cum-boundary: We have, for instance,
(−.1, .3) ≪ (0−, .5), and (.1, .3) ≪ (0+, .5), but no chronology relation between
(−.1, .3) and (0+, .5). This reflects an impossibility of passage from one side of
the slit to the other.) The GKP causal boundary produces precisely this latter
boundary, in addition to the standard points at future and past null- and timelike-
infinity associated with Minkowski space. The future (pre-)boundary points of
the GKP construction are similar, with the only difference being that there is a
“double-point” at the top of the boundary: (0−, 1) and (0+, 1) are not identified
but kept distinct. This last is the future chronological boundary.
What, then, does the universality of the future chronological boundary have to
say in this example? It says that the future chronological boundary covers any
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other (past-distinguishing) boundary. For instance, the full GKP causal boundary
identifies the double-point of the future chronological boundary into a single point.
The first boundary mentioned, consisting of L itself, identifies all the pairs of points
(0−, t) and (0+, t). Other boundaries can be imagined, such as identifying (0−, t)
and (0+, t) for some but not all t. (Note that past-distinguishment in the boundary
necessitates retaining the identification of (0−, 0) and (0+, 0).) The point is that
any appropriate boundary construction for M , intending to add future endpoints
for all timelike curves, can be mapped onto by the future chronological boundary, in
a manner that appropriately preserves the chronological relation; that this mapping
is unique; and that the entire construction is categorical in nature.
For a more realistic example, let our spacetime be Schrwazschild space. The
standard picture of the (future) singularity is of S2×R1: a 2-sphere (parametrized
by φ and θ) at each point of r = 0 and any t ∈ R, using Schwarzschild coordi-
nates. We also have future null-infinity (ℑ+ = S2 × R1: r =∞, other coordinates
arbitrary) and future timelike-infinity (i+, a single point). What other reasonable
options are there for future boundary points in Schwarzschild? The boundary just
described is the future chronological boundary (external Schwarzschild is conformal
to a standard static spacetime, which makes it easy to find its causal boundary). It
follows that any past-distinguishing way of putting a future boundary on Schwarz-
schild must be a quotient of this: We can collapse the singularity to, for instance, a
projective space or lens space at each value of t, and we can make identifications in
ℑ+, but we cannot blow up i+ into a sphere or anything other than a single point.
It may be helpful to outline the some of the complexities encountered in this
presentation.
The first step is to define a category which contains both reasonable (strongly
causal) spacetimes and any such spacetime combined with a boundary of any sort
(including an extension of the chronology relation to the boundary). The next
step is to define a “future-completion” construction which will apply to any object
in this category; it should replicate the GKP future (pre-)boundary construction
when applied to spacetimes, and should yield nothing new when applied to an object
which is already “future-complete”. It is also intended that this future-completion
construction not change anything in the original object, but just add additional
points.
A problem arises in this, however: The condition used to define the the chronol-
ogy relation for the new (future boundary) points—the same criterion as in the
GKP construction—is not necessarily compatible with the pre-existing chronology
relation in the original object. (Among spacetimes, global hyperbolicity prevents
this from happening, but the idea is to provide a construction for all strongly causal
spacetimes.) The problem is that if the same criterion is applied to the original
object, then more pairs of points ought to be considered as chronologically related
than was originally the case. For instance, if the object is the spacetime M from
the example above, then the criterion applied to M would have (−1,−1)≪ (.5, 1);
but there is no timelike curve between those points inM . Among other things, this
incompatibility interferes with the functoriality of the future-completion construc-
tion.
The solution is to define an additional construction (“past-determination”) on
these objects whose sole purpose is to add in precisely those additional chronology
relations so that when the future-completion construction is applied, the result is
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compatible with the chronology relation in the past-determined object. This defeats
the intent of preserving the original chronology relation for the object, but there is
no getting around this point. Indeed, this is precisely the tack chosen by GKP: The
chronology relation in the GKP construction results in additional relations within
the spacetime, exactly the same ones as the past-determination construction here.
The exposition here essentially separates out this portion of the GKP construction
for its own categorical and universal explication.
One still has to contend with the question of whether it makes a difference if one
first past-determines and then future-completes, or does it the other way around.
As it turns out, these operations are categorically commutative; but that takes
some doing to establish.
Finally, one needs to make a comparison between the future chronological bound-
ary construction here—the GKP future (pre-)boundary—and the full GKP causal
boundary. A difficulty arises in that the simple definition of future-complete used
here is not generally satisfied by the GKP causal boundary; a slight generalization
is needed, allowing, for instance, for the identification of points such as in the cuasl
boundary of the example M above. But all goes through, as exemplified in that
example.
In summation: Section II introduces the basic category and the future-comple-
tion operation; this applies, without further modification, to globally hyperbolic
spacetimes. Section III defines the past-determination operation, extending the
results of Section 1 to, for instance, all strongly causal spacetimes. Section IV
addresses the generalization that is necessary in order to include such completions
as those deriving from the full GKP construction.
A word on what this paper addresses and what it does not:
The intent here is to provide a justification for the use of the causal boundary
construction. This is accomplished largely though showing how at least the future
portion of that construction provides a universal standard of comparison for any
other future-completing boundary, in tems of the chronology relation.
One obvious failing of this enterprise is to evince a similar standard of comparison
for the full causal boundary. This, however, I believe to be innately impossible: As
evidenced in the Appendix, the full causal boundary simply does not result in a
complete object. This does not necessarily mean that the full causal boundary is
an inappropriate tool, but it does detract from hopes of its having a universal role
in boundary considerations.
Another element missing here is the causality relation. I believe it possible to do
much of the same work here with the causality relation included, but it seems an
unnecessary complication at this point. The chronology relation suffices to cover
much of the necessary structures, and it yields a satisfactory universality result.
Topology is probably the most complex element missing from this development.
It would be desireable to have a universality result which included full topological
information, not just chronological. This is a matter under investigation and the
subject for another paper.
Section II: Chronological Sets and Future Completion
The intent here is to abstract and axiomatize the chronology relation in a space-
time: A point x chronologically precedes a point y, written x ≪ y, if and only if
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there is a future-directed timelike curve from x to y. This is the relation that must
be emulated for the new category.
We start with a subset of the needed properties:
A pre-chronological set is a set X together with a relation ≪ satisfying the
following conditions:
(1) ≪ is transitive: x≪ y ≪ z implies x≪ z
(2) ≪ is non-reflexive: for all x, not(x≪ x)
(3) X has no isolates: for all x, I−(x) = {y|y ≪ x}, the past of x, or I+(x) =
{y|x≪ y}, the future of x, is non-empty
(4) ≪ is full: for any x≪ y, there is some z with x≪ z ≪ y
For any non-empty subset A of a pre-chronological set X , the past of A, I−[A],
is
⋃
a∈A I
−(a) (the future of A, and all subsequent dualizations, are defined analo-
gously). A non-empty subset P is a past set if I−[P ] = P . (In general, ( ) will be
used to indicate application of an operator to an entity to be regarded as a single-
element argument, [ ] will be used to indicate application to each of the various
elements making up the argument.)
1. Proposition. In a pre-chronological set, any non-empty set of the form I−[A]
is a past set.
Proof. By transitivity, I−[I−[A]] ⊂ I−[A]. Now suppose x≪ a for a ∈ A; then, by
fullness, there is some y with x≪ y ≪ a. Thus, I−[I−[A]] = I−[A]. 
A past set is decomposable if it is the union of two proper subsets that are past
sets. An indecomposable past set is often called an IP.
2. Theorem. In a pre-chronological set, a past set P is indecomposable if and only
if for every x and y in P , there is some z ∈ P with x≪ z and y ≪ z.
Proof. (This theorem is due to Geroch, Kronheimer, and Penrose; the proof here
is adapted from [HE], in the proof of Proposition 6.8.1.)
Suppose P is decomposable as P1 ∪ P2 (proper past subsets). Then neither
P1 ⊂ P2 nor P2 ⊂ P1, so we can find x1 ∈ P1 − P2 and x2 ∈ P2 − P1. Then there
can be no y ∈ P with x1 ≪ y and x2 ≪ y: If y is in, say, P1, then since x2 ≪ y,
x2 ∈ P1 also, which is false.
Suppose P is indecomposable. For any x1 and x2 in P , let Qi = {q ∈ P |
not(xi ≪ q)}, and let Pi = I−[Qi] (for each i). Note that Pi ⊂ Qi: For x ∈ Pi,
there is some q ∈ P with x ≪ q and not(xi ≪ q); thus, x ∈ P and not(xi ≪ x)
(lest xi ≪ q), so x ∈ Qi. Therefore, Pi cannot be all of P , since Qi is not (since xi
is in P and P = I−[P ], there must be some pi ∈ P with xi ≪ pi). Since P1 and
P2 are both past sets, it follows from P being an IP that P 6= P1 ∪ P2, i.e., there is
some p ∈ P with p 6∈ I−[Q1] and p 6∈ I−[Q2]. Now, since P = I−[P ], there is some
z ∈ P with p ≪ z; it then follows that z must be in neither Qi, i.e., that x1 ≪ z
and x2 ≪ z. 
A future chain in a pre-chronological set X is a sequence {xn |n ≥ 1} of points
in X such that for all n, xn ≪ xn+1.
A subset S of a pre-chronological set X is called dense in X if for all x and y
in X with x ≪ y, there is some s in S with x ≪ s ≪ y. X is separable (in a
chronological sense) if there is a countable dense set.
The following theorem shows how future chains in a chronological set replace
future timelike curves in a spacetime; this is adapted from Proposition 6.8.1 in
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[HE], due to Geroch, Kronheimer, and Penrose, which makes essentially the same
statement with “timelike curve” in the place of “chain”.
3. Theorem. A past set in a separable pre-chronological set is indecomposable if
and only if it is the past of a future chain.
Proof. Let P be I−[{xn|n ≥ 1}] for {xn} a future chain; then for any p1 and p2 in P ,
there are numbers n1 and n2 with p1 ≪ xn1 and p2 ≪ xn2 . Let k = 1+max{n1, n2};
then xk is in P and has each pi in its past.
Let P be an IP. If S is the countable dense set for the pre-chronological set,
then P ∩ S = {pn|n ≥ 1} is a dense set in P . Pick x1 ≪ p1 (one can always
arrange to have the first element of S have a non-empty past). Suppose we’ve
defined {x1, ..., xk} with xi ∈ P and xi−1 ≪ xi and pi ≪ xi for each i ≤ k.
Then by Theorem 2 there is some xk+1 ∈ P with xk ≪ xk+1 and pk+1 ≪ xk+1.
This defines‘for us the future chain {xn} in P with pn ≪ xn for each n. Clearly,
I−[{xn}] ⊂ P . For any x ∈ P , since P is a past set, there is some y ∈ P with
x≪ y; then there is some k with x≪ pk ≪ y, so pk ≪ xk shows us x≪ xk. Thus,
I−[{xn}] = P . 
We will say that an IP P is generated by any future chain c for which P = I−[c].
A pre-chronological set is called past-distinguishing if for points x and y, I−(x) =
I−(y) implies x = y. (Unlike nearly all the other terms defined here, this one is
traditional, following the usage in [HE].)
For a future chain c = {xn|n ≥ 1}, a point x is called a future limit of c if
I−(x) = I−[c]. Note that if x is a future limit of c, then for all n, xn ≪ x, since
I−(x) includes I−(xn+1). Also, if x is a future limit of c, then it is also a future limit
of every sub-chain of c; and, conversely, if x is a future limit of some sub-chain of c,
then it is also a future limit of c. Clearly, in a past-distinguishing pre-chronological
set, a future chain can have at most one future limit. (We could define a topology
from this notion of convergence—a set is (future-) closed if it contains all future
limits of future chains within it—but this will not be pursued here.)
A pre-chronological set that is separable is called a chronological set . A chrono-
logical set for which every future chain has a future limit is called future-complete.
It will prove useful to have the ≪ relation determined, in a certain sense, by
I−: Specifically, call a pre-chronological set X past-determined if for any x and y
in X , if I−(x) is non-empty and for some w ≪ y, I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), then x ≪ y.
(We can also say that x is past-determined if I−(x) is non-empty and whenever
I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), x≪ y for all y ≫ w.)
4. Theorem. A strongly causal spacetime is a past-distinguishing chronological
set; if it has the property that the past of x is contained in the past of y implies
that x causally precedes y (for instance, any globally hyperbolic spacetime), then it
is past-determined. A future limit of a future chain in a spacetime is the same as
a topological limit.
Proof. A spacetime is clearly a pre-chronological set; it is separable in the chrono-
logical sense because it is separable in the topological sense. A strongly causal
spacetime is past-distinguishing (see, e.g., [HE]).
If I−(x) ⊂ I−(w) implies x ∈ J−(w) (points causally preceding w), then with
w ≪ y also, we have x ≪ y. Globally hyperbolic spacetimes are examples of this:
For I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), consider any z ≪ x; then since z ∈ I−(x), z is also in I−(w),
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so z ≪ w. It follows that the space C(z, w) of causal curves from z to w is compact
in the C0 topology. Let σ be a future timelike curve with σ(0) = z and σ(1) = x;
for all t < 1, there is also a future timelike curve τt from σ(t) to w. Let ct be the
concatenation of σ|[0,t] with τt; then the family of causal curves {ct} has a causal
limit curve c1 in C(z, w); since c1 must pass through x, this shows x ∈ J
−(w).
In a strongly causal spacetime, each point has a fundamental neighborhood sys-
tem {Un} such that for each n, Un is geodesically convex and for any point x ∈ Un,
any other point y ∈ Un is timelike-related to x iff it is joined to x by a timelike
geodesic in Un (x≪ y but not joined by a timelike geodesic in Un implies that the
timelike geodesic connecting them must exit and re-enter Un, which can be pre-
vented with correct choice of Un). Let c = {xn} be a future chain. First suppose
that c has a topological limit x; then c eventually enters all such neighborhoods
Un of x as just described. For any y ≪ x, we have x ∈ I
+(y), a neighborhood
of x; thus, eventually, xn ∈ I+(y), i.e., y ≪ xn: I−(x) ⊂ I−[c]. If any xm fails
to be in the past of x, the same is true for all xk with k > m. Consider such an
xk in a neighborhood Un of x as above; due to the chronological relation in Un
being given by the geodesic structure, this is essentially the same causal relations
as exist in Minkowski space: In particular, xk+1 is not in closure(I
−(x)), and all
xj for j > k+1 are in I
+(xk+1), whose closure does not include x. This violates x
being the limit of c; thus, we must have I−(x) = I−[c]. Conversely, suppose that
I−(x) = I−[c]; then we have xn ≪ x for each n (since xn ∈ I
−[c]). Using the
neighborhoods Un of x from above, we can find a past chain {yi} in I+(x) and a
future chain {zi} in I−(x) with x the topological limit of both chains and the sets
{Vi = I−(yi)∩ I+(zi)} a fundamental neighborhood system for x. Then for each i,
since zi ∈ I−(x) = I−[c], xn ≫ zi for sufficiently large n. Since xn ≪ x≪ yi, this
gives xn ∈ Vi for sufficiently large n, i.e., x is the topological limit of c. 
For a chronological set X , let ∂ˆ(X) = {P |P is an IP in X such that P is not
I−(x) for any point x ∈ X}, the future chronological boundary of X . Let Xˆ =
X ∪ ∂ˆ(X), the future chronological completion of X . Define an extension of ≪ on
X to Xˆ by the following:
(1) among points in X , there is no change in ≪
(2) for x ∈ X and P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), x≪ P iff x ∈ P
(3) for x ∈ X and P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), P ≪ x iff for some y ∈ X with y ≪ x, P ⊂ I−(y)
(4) for P ∈ ∂ˆ(X) and Q ∈ ∂ˆ(X), P ≪ Q iff for some y ∈ Q, P ⊂ I−(y).
Where it is necessary to distinguish between the relation on X and that on Xˆ, Iˆ−
will be used for the latter. (Thus, x ∈ Iˆ−(y) iff x ∈ I−(y), and so on.) Note that
Iˆ−(P ) = P ∪ {Q ∈ ∂ˆ(X)|Q ⊂ I−(w) for some w ∈ P} = Iˆ−[P ] (the first being the
past of a single point in Xˆ, the last being the past of a subset of Xˆ); in particular,
Iˆ−(P ) ∩ X = P . Also note that P is a future limit of a future chain c (in Xˆ) if
and only if P is generated by c (I−[c] = P iff I−[c] = I−[P ] iff Iˆ−[c] = Iˆ−[P ] iff
Iˆ−[c] = Iˆ−(P )).
5. Theorem. Let X be a chronological set. Then
(1) Xˆ is a chronological set;
(2) if X is past-distinguishing, then so is Xˆ;
(3) if X is past-determined, then so is Xˆ; and
(4) Xˆ is future-complete.
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Proof. (1) Xˆ is a chronological set:
This is a matter of routine checking of various cases. For instance, to show
transitivity, one of the cases to be established is that for x in X and P and Q in
∂ˆ(X), if x ≪ P ≪ Q, then x ≪ Q: We have x ∈ Q and Q ⊂ I−(w) for some
w ∈ R; then x≪ w, and, since R is a past set, x ∈ R, i.e. x≪ R.
A set which is dense in X is dense in Xˆ as well (routine to establish).
Note that Xˆ has no isolates, since for any P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), Iˆ−(P ) includes the elements
of P , which is non-empty.
(2) IfX is past-distinguishing, then Xˆ is also (x, P , and Q as above, with y ∈ X):
Suppose Iˆ−(x) = Iˆ−(y). Then, in particular, I−(x) = I−(y), so x = y.
Suppose Iˆ−(x) = Iˆ−(P ). Then, in particular, Iˆ−(P ) ∩ X = I−(x); but this
means P = I−(x), which is forbidden by the definition of ∂ˆ(X).
Suppose Iˆ−(P ) = Iˆ−(Q). Then, in particular, Iˆ−(P ) ∩X = Iˆ−(Q) ∩X , which
just means precisely that P = Q.
(3) If X is past-determined, then Xˆ is also (notation as above):
First note that if Iˆ−(x) is non-empty, then so is I−(x) (P ≪ x requires some
w ≪ x), and Iˆ−(P ) is always non-empty.
Suppose Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) with w ≪ y; then I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), so x ≪ y. Suppose
Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(Q) with Q ≪ y, i.e., Q ⊂ I−(w) and w ≪ y; then I−(x) ⊂ Q, so
I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), so x≪ y.
Suppose Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) with w ∈ R and Iˆ−(x) non-empty; then we can find
z ∈ R with w ≪ z, so the previous result gives us x ≪ z, so x ∈ R, so x ≪ R.
Suppose Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(Q) with Q ⊂ I−(w) and w ∈ R; then pick z the same, and
the previous result gives x≪ z, so x ∈ R, i.e., x≪ R.
Suppose Iˆ−(P ) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) with w ≪ y; then P ⊂ I−(w), so P ≪ y. Suppose
Iˆ−(P ) ⊂ Iˆ−(Q) with Q ⊂ I−(w) and w ≪ y; then P ⊂ Q, so P ⊂ I−(w), so
P ≪ y.
Suppose Iˆ−(P ) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) with w ∈ R; then pick z ∈ R (i.e., z ≪ R) with w≪ z,
and the previous result yields P ≪ z, so P ≪ R. Suppose Iˆ−(P ) ⊂ Iˆ−(Q) with
Q ⊂ I−(w) and w ∈ R (i.e., w ≪ R); then the previous result yields P ≪ w, so
P ≪ R.
(4) Xˆ is future-complete:
First consider a future chain c = {xn} made up of points of X . Let P = I−[c];
then P is an IP in X . If there is a point x ∈ X with I−(x) = P , then x is a future
limit of c: Since each xn ≪ x, for any α ∈ Iˆ−(xn), α ≪ x also; for y ∈ I−(x),
we have y ∈ I−[c]; and for Q ≪ x with Q ∈ ∂ˆ(X), we have Q ⊂ I−(w) for some
w ≪ x, hence, w ≪ xn for some n, so Q ≪ xn. Now suppose, on the other hand,
that P ∈ ∂ˆ(X); then P is a future limit of c, as noted previously.
Now consider a future chain c in which there is some sub-chain c′ consisting of
points in X . By the paragraph above, c′ has a future limit, which is then also a
future limit for c.
For a future chain consisting solely of elements of ∂ˆX , just interpolate elements
of S (the countable dense subset of X) into the chain, resulting in a new future
chain to which the previous paragraph applies; this has the same future limits as
the original one. 
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Let f : X → Y be a set map between pre-chronological sets. We will call f
chronological if x ≪ y in X implies f(x) ≪ f(y) in Y ; f will be called future-
continuous if, in addition, whenever x is a future limit of a future chain c in X ,
f(x) is a future limit of f [c] (necessarily a future chain in Y ). For any chronological
set X , we have the future-continuous map ιˆX : X → Xˆ given by ιˆX(x) = x; this
is the standard future injection of X (that it is future-continuous follows directly
from the definitions).
For M and N strongly causal spacetimes, a function f : M → N is both past-
and future-continuous if and only if it is (topologically) continuous and carries
timelike curves to timelike curves, preserving time-orientation. This can be seen
by examining, for a point x ∈ M with sequence {xn} topologically converging
to x, a fundamental neighborhood system of the form described in the proof of
Theorem 4, {Vi = I−(yi) ∩ I+(zi)} for {yi} a past chain and {zi} a future chain,
both with x as topological limit. With f both past- and future-continuous, we
have f(x) is the topological limit of the chains {f(yi)} and {f(zi)}, so {Wi =
I−(f(yi))∩ I+f(zi))} is a fundamental neighborhood system for f(x). Eventually,
xn ∈ Vi, whence f(xn) ∈ Wi; thus, f is topologically continuous. However, a merely
future-continuous function need not be continuous: Consider f : L2 → L2 defined
by f(x, t) = (x, t) for t > 0 and f(x, t) = (x, t− 1) for t ≤ 0 (Ln denotes Minkowski
n-space).
Let f : X → Y be a chronological map between chronological sets with Y past-
distinguishing; we will define a map fˆ : Xˆ → Yˆ , the future completion of f . First
we define f¯ : P(X) → P(Y ) (the power sets) by f¯(S) = I−[f [S]]. For any point
x ∈ X , we just let fˆ(x) = f(x). For an IP P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), first note that f¯(P ) is an
IP in Y : This is because for any future chain c generating P , f¯(P ) = I−[f [c]]. If
there is some y ∈ Y with I−(y) = f¯(P ), then we let fˆ(P ) = y; otherwise, we let
fˆ(P ) = f¯(P ). (Note that fˆ can be defined even if Y is not past-distinguishing, so
long as there is never more than a single point y ∈ Y for which I−(y) is the same
as a given f¯(P ).)
6. Proposition. Let f : X → Y be a chronological map between chronological sets
with Y past-determined and past-distinguishing (or, more generally: for any future
chain in X with no future limit in X, its image under f does not have more than
one future limit in Yˆ ); then fˆ is also chronological. If f is future-continuous, then
fˆ is the unique future-continuous map such that fˆ ◦ ιˆX = ιˆY ◦ f .
Proof. That fˆ ◦ ιˆX = ιˆY ◦ f is clear. From this and f being chronological it follows
that x ≪ y in X implies fˆ(x) ≪ fˆ(y). Suppose x ≪ P for x ∈ X and P ∈ ∂ˆ(X).
Let P be generated by a future chain c = {xn}, so that f [c] generates f¯(P ). We have
x ∈ P , so x≪ xn for some n; thus, f(x)≪ f(xn), so f(x) ∈ f¯(P ). If f¯(P ) ∈ ∂ˆ(Y ),
this is all we need for fˆ(x) ≪ fˆ(P ); otherwise, for some y ∈ Y , f¯(P ) = I−(y), so
f(x) ∈ I−(y), orMf(x) ≪ y, so fˆ(x) ≪ fˆ(P ). If P ≪ x (same notation), then
P ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x. With the future chain c as before, we have for all
n, xn ≪ w ≪ x, so f(xn) ≪ f(w) ≪ f(x). This gives us f¯(P ) ⊂ I−(f(w)). If
f¯(P ) ∈ ∂ˆ(Y ), then fˆ(P ) ≪ fˆ(x); otherwise, for some y ∈ Y , f¯(P ) = I−(y), so
y ≪ f(x) by Y being past-determined. Finally, suppose P ≪ Q for P and Q in
∂ˆ(X); then there is some x ∈ X with P ≪ x≪ Q, so the previous results apply.
Suppose f is future-continuous. Clearly, for a point x ∈ X being a future limit
of a future chain of points c = {xn} in X , the same is true for fˆ(x) and {fˆ(xn)}.
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For P ∈ ∂ˆ(X) being a future limit of the chain, since P is generated by c, f¯(P ) is
generated by f [c]. Thus, if f¯(P ) ∈ ∂ˆ(Y ), then it is the future limit of f [c], and we
are done, since fˆ(P ) = f¯(P ). Otherwise, for some y ∈ Y , f¯(P ) = I−(y) and again
we are done, since fˆ(P ) = y and y is a future limit of f [c] = fˆ [c]. We need concern
ourselves solely with chains of points in X , for any other sort can have points of X
interpolated into it with no change in future limits.
The restriction of fˆ to X is uniquely determined by fˆ ◦ ιˆX = ιˆY ◦ f . For fˆ to
be future-continuous, for any P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), since P is a future limit of any chain c
generating it, we must have fˆ(P ) a future limit of f [c]. With Y past-distinguishing
(or, more generally, with the definition of fˆ above yielding a well-defined function),
this is unique. 
Another way to express the previous result is more closely related to adjunctions:
7. Corollary. Let f : X → Y be a future-continuous function between chronologi-
cal sets with Y past-determined, past-distinguishing, and future-complete (or, more
generally: for any future chain in X, its image under f has exactly one future limit
in Y , which is past-determined); then there is a unique future-continuous function
fˆ : Xˆ → Y such that fˆ ◦ ιˆX = f .
Proof. We need but note that with Y being future complete, Yˆ = Y and ιˆY is the
identity map on Y ; then Proposition 6 applies. 
Conversely, we could have started with Corollary 7 and deduced Proposition 6:
Given future-continuous f : X → Y with Y past-determined and past-distinguish-
ing, we have ιˆY ◦ f : X → Yˆ fulfilling the hypotheses of Corollary 7, yielding
fˆ : Xˆ → Yˆ as the unique future-continuous map such that fˆ ◦ ιˆX = ιˆY ◦ f .
These results allow us to define some categories, some functors, a natural trans-
formation, and an adjunction: Let Chron be the category of chronological sets
with morphisms all chronological functions; since the composition of chronological
functions is clearly chronological, this is a category. Let PdetPdisChron be the
subcategory of past-determined, past-distinguishing chronological sets, with mor-
phisms all future-continuous functions; again, a composition of future-continuous
functions is future-continuous, so this is a category. Let FcplPdetPdisChron be
the full subcategory of PdetPdisChron of objects which are also future-complete.
Then future completion is a functor ̂ : PdetPdisChron→ FcplPdetPdisChron
(we need only check that ĝ ◦ f = gˆ ◦ fˆ ; this follows from the uniqueness part of
Proposition 6, since gˆ ◦ fˆ has the requisite properties); while Theorem 5 gives us
the right properties for the future completion of any chronological set, Proposition
6 gives us functoriality only for this subcategory. We also have the forgetful func-
tor Uˆ : FcplPdetPdisChron→ PdetPdisChron. The maps ιˆX define a natural
transformation ιˆ : I →˙ Uˆ◦̂ (where I is the identity functor on PdetPdisChron).
Finally, Proposition 7 gives us the universality condition on ιˆ making ̂ left adjoint
to Uˆ. From category theory we obtain
8. Theorem. The future completion functor and the standard future injection are,
up to natural isomorphism, the unique construction yielding a future-continuous
map from any past-determined, past-distinguishing chronological set to a future-
complete, past-determined, past-distinguishing chronological set, consistent with all
future-continuous maps and yielding a unique extension for any future-continuous
12 STEVEN G. HARRIS
map into a future-complete, past-determined, past-distinguishing chronological set.

To restate the previous three theorems in summary form:
(1) ForX inChron, Y in PdetPdisChron, and f : X → Y future-continuous,
fˆ : Xˆ → Yˆ is a future-continuous map with fˆ ◦ ιˆX = ιˆY ◦ f .
(2) For X in Chron, Y in FcplPdetPdisChron, and f : X → Y future-
continuous, fˆ : Xˆ → Y is the unique future-continuous map with fˆ ◦ ιˆX = f .
(3) Restricted to PdetPdisChron, the construction of Xˆ, fˆ , and ιˆX is func-
torial, natural, and universal, hence, unique as a way to fulfill (1) and (2)
in such a manner.
Section III: Past-Determination Functor
It is quite common for a spacetime not to be past-determined, so there is a
limited application of the functor ̂ to spacetimes. However, this can be remedied
if we are willing to create new ≪ relations in the spacetime, in order to make it
past-determined. We will do this generally:
Consider a pre-chronological set X ; using the same set X , let us define a new
relation, ≪p: For any x and y in X , set x≪p y if x≪ y or if I−(x) is non-empty
and for some w ≪ y, I−(x) ⊂ I−(w); we’ll use I−p to denote the past of a point
(or set) using the ≪p relation. Clearly, ≪p is an extension of ≪. Note that if X is
past-determined, then ≪p is identical to ≪.
Two properties of ≪p should be noted: First, for any x, I−[I−p(x)] = I−(x): If
y ≪ z ≪p x, then z ≪ x (and so y ≪ x) or I−(z) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x; we
have y ∈ I−(z), so we get y ∈ I−(w), i.e., y ≪ w, so y ≪ x. On the other hand,
if y ≪ x, then by fullness there is some z with y ≪ z ≪ x; this gives us z ≪p x,
so y ∈ I−[I−p(x)]. Second, I−(x) ⊂ I−(y) if and only if I−p(x) ⊂ I−p(y): Given
I−(x) ⊂ I−(y), if z ≪p x, then we have z ≪ x (so z ∈ I−(x) ⊂ I−(y) ⊂ I−p(y)) or
we have I−(z) 6= ∅ and I−(z) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x; in the latter case, we have
w ≪ y also, so z ≪p y. On the other hand, given I−p(x) ⊂ I−p(y), we obtain, from
the first property noted, I−(x) = I−[I−p(x)] ⊂ I−[I−p(y)] = I−(y). In particular,
we have I−(x) = I−(y) if and only if I−p(x) = I−p(y).
For a spacetime, the physical significance of the ≪p relation can be viewed this
way: Consider any observer as compiling an encyclopedia of all events witnessed;
the spacetime is to be thought of also as the set of encyclopedias, with the event p
corresponding to the history of all events in I−(p). Then p ≪p q means that not
only has q transcribed all the events that are written at p, but, moreover, has had
a chance to think about them (i.e., an observer has traveled from some event w,
which has recorded all events that are written at p, and then continued on to event
q).
We will use Xp to denote X with the relation≪p; call it the past-determination
of X .
If c = {xn} is a future chain in Xp, then we have for all n, I−(xn) ⊂ I−(wn) for
some sequence {wn} with wn ≪ xn+1. This gives us wn ∈ I
−(xn+1) ⊂ I
−(wn+1),
so wn ≪ wn+1: c′ = {wn} is a future chain in X . Note that I−[c′] = I−[c], due
to the interweavings I−(xn) ⊂ I−(wn) and I−(wn) ⊂ I−(xn+1); in general, when
this interweaving obtains, we will say that c′ (in X) is an associated chain to c (in
Xp). This works well for looking at future limits:
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9. Lemma. Let c′ be a future chain in X associated to a future chain c in Xp.
Then a point x is a future limit of c in Xp if and only if it is a future limit of c′ in
X.
Proof. Suppose I−p(x) = I−p[c]; then I−(x) = I−[c] = I−[c′]. Now suppose
I−(x) = I−[c′]; then I−(x) = I−[c]. Let c = {xn}. For z ≪p x, we have I−(z)
is non-empty and I−(z) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x; since I−(x) = I−[c], we have
w ≪ xn for some n, so z ∈ I−p[c]. On the other hand, if z ∈ I−p[c], then I−(z) is
non-empty and I−(z) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ xn for some n; then (since I−[c] =
I−(x)) w ≪ x also, so z ≪p x. 
10. Proposition. For any pre-chronological set X, Xp is a past-determined pre-
chronological set. If X is a chronological set, so is Xp; if X is past-distinguishing,
so is Xp; and if X is future-complete, so is Xp.
Proof. This is largely routine. For example, to show Xp is past-determined, con-
sider I−p(x) ⊂ I−p(w) with I−p(x) non-empty and w ≪p y; we want to show
x ≪p y. From w ≪p y we know that for some v ≪ y, I−(w) ⊂ I−(v) (this is
true even if w ≪ y). We have I−(x) ⊂ I−(w), so I−(x) ⊂ I−(v). Since I−p(x) is
non-empty, so is I−(x). Thus, x≪p y.
Suppose X is future-complete. Let c = {xn} be a future chain in Xp. Let x be
a future limit of an associated future chain c′ in X ; then by Lemma 9, x is also a
future limit of c in Xp. 
Past-determination works well with future-continuous functions, so long as the
domain has the property that every point is a future limit of some future chain; let
us call this property being past-connected . Clearly, any spacetime is past-connected,
and future completion preserves being past-connected (since an element of the fu-
ture chronological boundary is always a future limit of any of its generating chains).
Also, forming the past-determination of a pre-chronological set preserves being past-
connected, in virtue of Lemma 9.
11. Proposition. If f : X → Y is a future-continuous map between pre-chrono-
logical sets, and X is past-connected, then the same function fp = f : Xp → Y p
between the past-determinations is also future-continuous.
Proof. First we will show that fp is chronological; we must show that if x ≪p y,
then f(x) ≪p f(y): We have I−(x) is non-empty and I−(x) ⊂ I−(w) for some
w ≪ y. We have some z ≪ x, so f(z) ≪ f(x): I−(f(x)) is non-empty. With
x a future limit of a future chain c, f(x) is a future limit of f [c], so I−(f(x))
= I−[f [c]]. We have c ⊂ I−(w), so f [c] ⊂ I−(f(w)), so I−[f [c]] ⊂ I−(f(w)).
Therefore, I−(f(x)) ⊂ I−(f(w)) and f(w)≪ f(y): f(x)≪p f(y).
Now suppose that c = {xn} is a future chain in X
p with future limit x. For c′ an
associated chain in X , we know by Lemma 9 that x is also a future limit in X of c′;
then f(x) is a future limit in Y of f [c′]. Furthermore, f [c′] is an associated chain of
f [c] (the relations‘defining association are preserved by a chronological function),
so Lemma 9 also gives us that f(x) is a future limit in Y p of f [c]. 
For any pre-chronological set X , let us denote by ιpX : X → X
p the map which,
on the set level, is the identity map. This is clearly chronological, and it is also
future-continuous: If, for a future chain c and point x in X , I−(x) = I−[c], then
I−p(x) = I−p[c] also (using the second property of ≪p mentioned at the beginning
of this section).
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12. Corollary. Let f : X → Y be a future-continuous map between pre-chrono-
logical sets, with X past-connected and Y past-determined; then there is a unique
future-continuous map fp : Xp → Y such that fp ◦ ιpX = f .
Proof. By Proposition 10, Y p = Y . Then the map fp : Xp → Y p given by
Proposition 11 fills the required condition, and uniquely does so because of what
ι
p
X is on the set level. 
Proposition 11 and Corollary 12 have the same categorical properties as Propo-
sition 6 and Corollary 7, and we derive similar categorical constructions: We
have a functor p : PconChron → PdetPconChron, where -Pcon- denotes the
subcategory of past-connected objects. We also have a natural transformation
ι
p : I → Up ◦ p, where Up : PdetPconChron → PconChron is the forgetful
functor and I is the identity functor on PconChron. Then Corollary 12 is precisely
the statement that p (via ιp) is a left adjoint to Up. (The same applies to the re-
striction, in all cases, to the respective subcategories of past-distinguishing objects,
-Pdis-, which will be used for composition with the future completion functor.)
Thus, similar to Theorem 8, we can conclude that the past-determination functor
is the unique way to create a past-determined chronological set (at least, if one
starts with all points being future limits), in a categorical, natural, and universal
manner. Summarizing as before, we have
(4) For X in PconPrechron, Y in Prechron, and f : X → Y future-
continuous, fp : Xp → Y p is the unique future-continuous map with
fp ◦ ιpX = ι
p
Y ◦ f .
(5) For X in PconPrechron, Y in PdetPrechron, and f : X → Y future-
continuous, fp : Xp → Y is the unique future-continuous map with fp◦ιpX =
f .
(6) Restricted to PconChron (or, more generally, PconPrechron), the con-
struction of Xp, fp, and ιpX is functorial, natural, and universal, hence, the
unique way to fulfill (4) and (5) in such a manner. The same is true for the
further restriction to PconPdisChron.
We can combine these results with those of the previous section, composing
the categorical items: Restricting the functor ̂ to PdetPconPdisChron, we
have the composition ̂ ◦ p : PconPdisChron → FcplPdetPconPdisChron
and the forgetful functor U+ = Uˆ ◦Up in the opposite direction. For any X in
PconChron, let ι↑X = ιˆXp ◦ ι
p
X : X → X̂
p; then the collection of maps {ι↑X} forms
a natural transformation ι↑ : I →˙ U+ ◦̂◦ p (I as above), and this yields ̂◦ p as
left adjoint to U+. Summarizing as before, we have
(7) For X in PconChron, Y in PdisChron, and f : X → Y future-
continuous, f̂p : X̂p → Ŷ p is the unique future-continuous map with
f̂p ◦ ι↑X = ι
↑
Y ◦ f .
(8) For X in PconChron, Y in FcplPdetPdisChron, and f : X → Y future-
continuous, f̂p : X̂p → Y is the unique future-continuous map with f̂p◦ι↑X =
f .
(9) Restricted to PconPdisChron, the construction of X̂p, f̂p, and ι↑X is func-
torial, natural, and universal, hence, the unique way to fulfill (7) and (8) in
such a manner.
We need to consider how past-determination interacts with future completion.
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First, let us compare the past of a point x of X in Xˆp with its past in X̂p: For
y ∈ X , we have y ∈ Iˆ−p(x) if y ≪ x or if Iˆ−(y) is non-empty and Iˆ−(y) ⊂ Iˆ−(w)
for some w ≪ x; while we have y ∈ Î−p(x) if y ≪ x or if I−(y) is non-empty and
I−(y) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x. These are equivalent conditions: For instance,
suppose I−(y) ⊂ I−(w); then P ≪ y means P ⊂ I−(z) for some z ≪ y, which then
yields z ≪ w, so P ≪ w, also. For Q ∈ ∂ˆ(X), we have Q ∈ Iˆ−p(x) if Q≪ x—i.e.,
if Q ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x—or if Iˆ−(Q) is non-empty and Iˆ−(Q) ⊂ Iˆ−(w)
for some w ≪ x; while for Q ∈ ∂ˆ(Xp), we have Q ∈ Î−p(x) if Q ⊂ I−p(w) for
some w≪p x. But to compare these two conditions directly is awkward, and we’ll
instead use a pair of maps to aid in the analysis.
For a chronological set X , let us define the maps i : Xˆp → X̂p and j : X̂p → Xˆp
as follows: Both maps are to be the identity on X . For P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), let c be any
future chain in X generating P ; then i(P ) = I−p[c]. For Q ∈ ∂ˆ(Xp), let c be
a future chain in Xp generating Q; let c′ be an associated chain in X , and let
j(Q) = I−[c′].
13. Proposition. For any chronological set X, the maps i and j above are future-
continuous and give an isomorphism between Xˆp and X̂p.
Proof. We will use ≪ˆ to denote the relation in Xˆ, ≪ˆp to denote the relation in
Xˆp and ≪̂p to denote that in X̂p.
First we will treat i : Xˆp → X̂p. We have that for x ∈ X (= Xp), i(x) = x, and
for P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), i(P ) = I−p[c] for a future chain c in X generating P ; we need to
see that this is well-defined. Clearly, I−p[c] is an IP in Xp; it is in ∂ˆ(Xp) because
if I−p[c] = I−p(x), then I−[c] = I−(x), which is impossible with P ∈ ∂ˆ(X). We
can also write it as I−p[P ], which shows that it is independent of the chain taken
as the generator for P .
To show i is chronological, consider x and y in X , P and Q in ∂ˆ(X), and future
chains c = {xn} and d = {yn} generating P and Q respectively:
It is largely routine to show that if x ≪ˆp y, then x ≪̂p y. Since i(x) = x and
i(y) = y, we are done.
If x ≪ˆp Q, then we have x ≪ˆ Q or we have Iˆ−(x) 6= ∅ and Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w)
for some w ≪ˆ Q (as above, we can take w ∈ X). In the first case, we have
x ∈ Q = I−[d] ⊂ I−p[d]. In the second case, we have I−(x) 6= ∅ and I−(x) ⊂ I−(w)
and w ≪ yn for some n (since w ∈ Q), so x ≪
p yn, so again x ∈ I
−p[d]. In either
case, this gives us x ∈ i(Q), so i(x) ≪̂p i(Q), and we are done.
If P ≪ˆp y (or Q), then we have that P ≪ˆ y (or Q)—in which case we have P ⊂
I−(w) for some w ≪ y (or w ∈ Q)—or we have that Iˆ−(P ) 6= ∅ and Iˆ−(P ) ⊂ Iˆ−(w)
for some w ≪ˆ y (or Q)—in which case we again have P ⊂ I−(w) and w ≪ y (or
w ∈ Q). Then in either case we have I−[c] ⊂ I−(w), so i(P ) = I−p[c] ⊂ I−p(w),
with w ≪p i(y) (or w ∈ i(Q)), so i(P ) ≪̂p i(y) (or i(Q)), and we are done.
Now we consider j : X̂p → Xˆp. For x ∈ Xp, j(x) = x, and for Q ∈ ∂ˆ(Xp),
j(Q) = I−[c′] for c′ a future chain in X associated to a chain c in Xp generating
Q. Clearly I−[c′] is an IP in X ; it is in ∂ˆ(X) because if x is a future limit in X for
c′, then it is also a future limit in Xp for c, which is impossible for Q ∈ ∂ˆ(Xp). We
can also write it as I−[Q], which shows it is independent of the chain taken as the
generator for Q and of the chain in X associated to that one.
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To show j is chronological, consider x and y in X , P and Q in ∂ˆ(Xp), and
c = {xn} and d = {yn} future chains in Xp generating, respectively, P and Q:
It is routine to show that if x ≪̂p y, then x ≪ˆp y. Thus, j(x) ≪ˆp j(y).
If x ≪̂p Q, then x ∈ Q. To show j(x) ≪ˆp j(Q), we must show either that
x ≪ˆ I−[Q] or that Iˆ−(x) 6= ∅ and Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) for some w ≪ˆ I−[Q], i.e.,
w ∈ Iˆ−[Q]. If x ∈ I−[Q], then we have x ≪ˆ Iˆ−[Q]. Otherwise, the only way
for x to be in Q is for there to be some q ∈ Q with x ≪p q, i.e., I−(x) 6= ∅ and
I−(x) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ q; then Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w), also. Since w is in I−[Q],
this shows j(x) ≪ˆp j(Q).
If P ≪̂p y (or Q), then P ⊂ I−p(w) for some w ≪p y (or in Q). We then have
j(P ) = I−[P ] ⊂ I−[I−p(w)] = I−(w). Taking the case of y, we need only (since
I−(w) 6= ∅) look at I−(w) ⊂ I−(z) for some z ≪ y. We have j(P ) ⊂ I−(z) (and
I−(j(P )) = I−[P ] contains points in P , so is non-empty), so j(P ) ≪ˆp y. For the
case of Q, we have w ∈ Q, so for some q ∈ Q, w ≪p q; again, we consider only
I−(w) ⊂ I−(z) for some z ≪ q. We have j(P ) ⊂ I−(z) with z ∈ I−[Q], i.e.,
z ≪ˆ j(Q); thus, j(P ) ≪ˆp j(Q).
Now we consider the compositions: For P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), j(i(P )) = I−[I−p[P ]] =
I−[P ] = P . Thus, we have j ◦ i = 1
Xˆp
. For Q ∈ ∂ˆ(Xp), i(j(Q)) = I−p[I−[Q]]. This
is clearly contained in Q; we must show it the same as Q. For q ∈ Q, we know there
is some p ∈ Q with q ≪p p, i.e., either q ≪ p (in which case we immediately have
q ∈ I−[I−[Q]] ⊂ I−p[I−[Q]]) or I−(q) 6= ∅ and I−(q) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ p.
In the latter case, we can find z with w ≪ z ≪ p, so that we have q ≪p z ≪ p,
yielding q ∈ I−p[I−[Q]]. This gives us i ◦ j = 1
X̂p
.
Now we know that i and j provide an isomorphism of sets-with-a-relation be-
tween Xˆp and X̂p. Since future limits are defined purely in terms of the relations,
we automatically get that both maps are future-continuous. 
It is tempting to think of the maps iX and jX , as collections for all X in Pcon-
PdisChron, as forming a pair of natural transformations i : p ◦ ̂ → ̂ ◦ p and
j : ̂ ◦ p → p ◦ ̂ ; since they are inverses of one another, we would then have a
natural isomorphism between the two constructions. This would then establish that
all that was done with the construction of X̂p can also be done with the construc-
tion of Xˆp. Since this latter is the construction that precisely reproduces the GKP
future causal boundary, this is a desirable outcome. However, there is a problem:
One cannot compose the functors in the order p ◦ ̂ , since Proposition 6 allows
us to conclude that fˆ : Xˆ → Yˆ is future-continuous (starting with f : X → Y
future-continuous) only if Y is already past-determined. But there is a way around
this difficulty, thereby establishing the categorical nature of the GKP construction:
We will use X+ to denote Xˆp, for X any chronological set. For a future-
continuous function f : X → Y between chronological sets, we cannot in gen-
eral consider fˆp, since fˆ is not in general future-continuous unless Y is past-
determined. But so long as Y is past-distinguishing and X is past-connected,
we can use f̂p : X̂p → Ŷ p, which is future-continuous; then we can define f+ =
jY ◦ f̂p ◦ iX : X+ → Y +. Finally, we define ι
+
X = jX ◦ ι
↑
X : X → X
+.
14. Theorem. For any chronological set X, X+ is past-determined and future-
complete, and ι+X : X → X
+ is future-continuous; if X is past-connected (or,
respectively past-distinguishing), then so is X+. If X is past-connected and Y is a
past-distinguishing chronological set, then for any future-continuous map f : X →
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Y , f+ : X+ → Y + is the unique future-continuous map such that f+ ◦ ι+X = ι
+
Y ◦ f .
If Y is also past-determined and future-complete, than f+ : X+ → Y is the unique
future-continuous map such that f+ ◦ ι+X = f .
Proof. We need to establish that several diagrams involving the injections ι com-
mute. Some of these follow from categorical principles when in the category Pcon-
Chron, but others involve the particularities of these maps (especially when past-
connectedness is not assumed).
One noncategorical result is the application of future-completion using the full
strength of Proposition 6: The purely categorical use of future completion applies
only to the category of past-determined, past-distinguishing chronological sets (as
per summary statement (3)), but we need to apply it to the map ιpX : X → X
p,
where it would be pointless to assume X past-determined. But Proposition 6 gives
us the result anyway, as displayed in Diagram 1:
X
ι
p
X−−−−→ XpyιˆX
yιˆXp
Xˆ
ι̂
p
X−−−−→ X̂p
Diagram 1. composition is ι↑X
The map ιpX is always future-continuous, as is the standard future injection ιˆ,
whether for X or for Xp. By Proposition 6, we can define future completion of
ι
p
X , and have it be future-continuous, even without X
p being past-distinguishing,
so long as for any future chain c in X generating an element of ∂ˆ(X), ιpX [c] has
no more than one future-limit in X̂p; but this is manifestly the case, since ∂ˆ(Xp)
(or ∂ˆ in general) is defined in such a way that no two elements can have identical
pasts. Proposition 6 also yields that Diagram 1 commutes, and, as indicated, the
composition is ι↑X .
For X past-connected, an entirely categorical result comes from starting with
ιˆX : X → Xˆ and applying the past-determination functor and the natural trans-
formation ιp, yielding the commutative diagram of future-continuous maps shown
in Diagram 2.
X
ι
p
X−−−−→ XpyιˆX
y(ιˆX)p
Xˆ
ι
p
Xˆ−−−−→ Xˆp
Diagram 2. composition is ι+X (see Diagram 4)
Even if X is not past-connected, Diagram 2 still commutes (since each compo-
sition is just inclusion), and (ιˆX)
p is still future-continuous: For chronologicality,
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we need to show that if x≪p y (in X), then x ≪ˆp y (in Xˆ): If I−(x) ⊂ I−(w) for
w ≪ y, then Iˆ−(x) ⊂ Iˆ−(w) and w ≪ˆ y. For future-continuity, we need to show
that if x is a future limit of a future chain c in Xp, then x is also a future limit of
c in Xˆp: If x is a future limit of c in Xp, then by Lemma 9 x is a future limit of
an associated future chain c′ in X ; application of the future-continuous ιˆX shows
that x is a future limit of c′ also in Xˆ; then, applying Lemma 9 once more (with c′
being associated to c in Xˆ as well as in X), we have x a future limit of c in Xˆp.
The identification of the composition in Diagram 2 as ι+X will follow from Diagram
4. But before that we must consider Diagram 3: This commutes because both
iX ◦ (ιˆX)p and ιˆXp are just inclusion on the set-level. Commuting in the other
direction, with jX , then follows automatically.
Xp Xpy(ιˆX)p
yιˆXp
Xˆp
iX−−−−→
←−
jX
X̂p
Diagram 3
The final result involving commuting injections is shown in Diagram 4. To
establish the commutativity, we first combine Diagrams 2 and 3 into Diagram 5
and compare with Diagram 1; we use the uniqueness property of future completion
from Proposition 6 (summary statement (1)) to see that that the bottom lines
of Diagrams 1 and 5 must be the same, and that is the content of Diagram 4.
(As before, establishing the result with iX automatically yields the result for jX).
Combining this with Diagram 1 and the definition of ι+X yields the identification
alluded to in Diagram 2.
Xˆ Xˆyιp
Xˆ
yι̂pX
Xˆp
iX−−−−→
←−
jX
X̂p
Diagram 4
X
ι
p
X−−−−→ Xp XpyιˆX
y(ιˆX)p
yιˆXp
Xˆ
ι
p
Xˆ−−−−→ Xˆp
iX−−−−→ X̂p
Diagram 5. Diagrams 2 and 3 combined
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Finally, in Diagram 6 we consider the diagram derived from future-continuous
f : X → Y for X past-connected and Y past-distinguishing. The top two portions
of Diagram 6 commute due to previously established results (summary statements
(1) and (4)). The bottom portion commutes, as that is the definition of f+. The
overall structure of Diagram 6 can be expressed as Diagram 7.
X
f
−−−−→ YyιpX
yιpY
Xp
fp
−−−−→ Y pyιˆXp
yιˆY p
X̂p
f̂p
−−−−→ Ŷ p
∼=
xiX ∼=
yjY
Xˆp = X+
f+
−−−−→ Y + = Yˆ p
Diagram 6
X
f
−−−−→ Yyι+X
yι+Y
X+
f+
−−−−→ Y +
Diagram 7. overall structure of Diagram 6
The map f+ is unique for fulfilling its role in Diagram 7, since for any other
future-continuous map g : X+ → Y + making Diagram 7 commute, iY ◦ g ◦ jX
would fill the role of f̂p in Diagram 6, and the uniqueness portion of summary
statement (4) would show iY ◦ g ◦ jX = f̂p, so g = f+.
If Y is also past-determined and future-complete, then Y + = Y and ι+Y = 1Y ,
yielding the last statement in the theorem. 
Theorem 14 enables us to define the functor + : PconPdisChron →
FcplPdetPconPdisChron, with X+ = Xˆp and f+ : X+ → Y +, even though we
cannot define f+ as fˆp. We also have the natural transformation ι+ : I →˙ U+ ◦+
(where I denotes the identity on PconPdisChron) yielding + as left adjoint to
U+. Since a functor can have only one left adjoint, up to natural isomorphism,
there must be a natural isomorphism, then, between + and ̂◦p. This is provided,
in fact, by i : + →˙ ̂◦ p and j : ̂◦ p →˙ +, whose naturality is a triviality.
Expressing this in summary form as before, we have
(10) ForX inPconChron, Y inPdisChron, and f : X → Y future-continuous,
f+ : X+ → Y + is the unique future-continuous map with f+ ◦ ι+X = ι
+
Y ◦ f .
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(11) For X in PconChron, Y in FcplPdetPdisChron, and f : X → Y
future-continuous, f+ : X+ → Y is the unique future-continuous map with
f+ ◦ ι+X = f .
(12) Restricted to PconPdisChron, the construction of X+, f+, and ι+X is
functorial, natural, and universal, hence, the unique way to fulfill (10) and
(11).
For a spacetime M , Mˆp is precisely the addition to M of the GKP future causal
boundary: Mˆ is identified with the IPs ofM (the TIPs—IPs not of the form I−(x) for
any point x—being ∂ˆ(M)), and the≪p relation is exactly that as specified by GKP.
Since any strongly causal spacetime M is in PconPdisChron, any “reasonable”
way of future-completing M—an embedding of M into a past-determined, past-
distinguishing, future-complete object—must contain the GKP future boundary
in the sense of Theorem 14: there is a unique future-continuous extension of the
embedding to the GKP future completion of M .
Typically, one applies these ideas by starting with a strongly causal spacetime
M and a purported future completion of it, such as a topological embedding of M
into another spacetime N , j :M → N , which preserves the chronological relations
of M and which includes future endpoints for all the endless timelike curves in M .
The actual object which is the purported future completion of M is the closure
of j(M) in N ; call this object Y , with a chronology relation inherited from N .
Then, since M is past-connected and Y (typically) is past-distinguishing, we have,
from Theorem 14, j+ : M+ → Y +; assuming Y is itself future-complete, we have
Y + = Y p. Then, in particular, j+ maps ∂ˆ(M) to the boundary of j[M ] in N . If we
had the good sense to choose the enveloping spacetime N in such a way that every
point in the closure of j[M ] was actually a future endpoint of a timelike curve in
M (mediated by j)—or if we restrict Y to be just such points—then Y is mapped
onto by j+, with the boundary-points of Y being covered by j+[∂ˆ(M)]. This places
strong restrictions on just what Y can be.
As an example, consider a spacetime M which is conformal to K ×L1, where K
is any compact Riemannian manifold (recall Ln denotes Minkowski n-space). M
is globally hyperbolic (any K × {t} is a Cauchy surface), hence, past-determined.
The future chronological boundary of M consists of a single point i+ which is the
future limit of every endless timelike curve. (This can be seen by observing that for
any point p ∈ M and any future-endless timelike curve c, c eventually enters the
future of p; this is best noted by looking at projections into the factors K and L1.)
Thus, for any past-distinguishing, past-determined, future-complete chronological
set Y and any future-continuous map f :M → Y , f has a unique future-continuous
extension to M ∪ {i+}; this means precisely that there is some point y+ ∈ Y such
that for every endless timelike curve c in M , y+ is the future limit of f ◦ c. In
other words, any “reasonable” way of putting a future boundary on M essentially
replicates the GKP procedure, producing i+ and nothing more (any other points
in Y which are neither in f [M ] nor y+ are not the future limit of anything in f [M ]
and are in that sense disconnected from M).
More generally, for M any strongly causal spacetime, let f : M → Y be any
future-continuous map into a past-distinguishing, future-complete, chronological
set. Applying the past-determination functor we have fp :Mp → Y p, a future con-
tinuous map into a past-determined, past-distinguishing, future-complete chrono-
logical set. Thus, we have the future extension of fp to f+ : M+ → Y p. Since
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∂ˆ(M) (the GKP future causal boundary of M) contains the future limit of every
future-endless timelike curve in M , the same is true of its image in Y p under f+;
assuming that f is an embedding of M into Y , this means that the portion of Y
which is directly connected to f [M ]—i.e., the points of Y which are future limits of
chains coming fromM—consists, aside from f [M ] itself, of a set future-continuously
mapped onto by the GKP future causal boundary of M .
Section IV: Generalized Conditions and Results
In a spacetime, for every point x, I−(x) is an IP; this is not necessarily so in
a chronological set X . A future chain c may not have a future limit because the
point x which one might nominate for the future limit of c, has a decomposable
past. However, this can still play the role of a future limit in a more generalized
sense. Let us order by inclusion the IPs contained within I−(x) (for any x ∈ X); if
P is maximal in this ordering, call it a past component of x (so if I−(x) is an IP,
there is only that one past component). Let us call x a generalized future limit of
a future chain c if I−[c] is a past component of x. As before, if x is a generalized
future limit of c, then it’s a generalized future limit of any sub-chain of c; conversely,
if it’s a generalized future limit of some sub-chain of c, then it’s a generalized future
limit of c. Call X generalized past-distinguishing if whenever x and y in X share a
past component, x = y (this is a stronger condition than being past-distinguishing).
If X is generalized past-distinguishing, a future chain can have no more than one
generalized future limit. Call X generalized future-complete if every future chain
has a generalized future limit (a weaker condition than being future-complete).
Call a chronological function f : X → Y generalized future-continuous if for every
generalized future limit x of a future chain c in X , f(x) is a generalized future
limit of f [c] (this is neither a stronger nor a weaker property than being future-
continuous); a composition of generalized future-continuous functions is generalized
future-continuous. Finally, call a point x ∈ X generalized past-determined if I−(x)
is non-empty and for any w with I−(w) containing some past component of x,
x ≪ y for all y ≫ w (a stronger property than being past-determined); and X is
generalized past-determined if all of its points are.
These generalized notions are what are needed to provide the mappings into
chronological sets with decomposable pasts for some of the points; a typical example
would be starting with a spacetime and embedding it into another manifold to
create a boundary for the spacetime, with some of the boundary points possibly
having decomposable pasts. We still get useful information, such as analogues
of Proposition 7, Corollary 12, and Theorem 14—allowing a comparison with the
GKP future causal boundary—so long as the envelopment obeys these generalized
notions:
15. Theorem. For any generalized future-continuous map f : X → Y with X a
past-connected chronological set and Y a generalized past-determined, generalized
past-distinguishing, generalized future-complete chronological set, there are unique
generalized future-continuous maps fˆ : Xˆ → Y , fp : Xp → Y , and f+ : X+ → Y
such that fˆ ◦ ιˆX = fp ◦ ι
p
X = f
+ ◦ ι+X = f .
Proof. First consider fˆ : For any P ∈ ∂ˆ(X), with c a future chain generating
P , fˆ [c] = f [c] must have a unique generalized future limit y ∈ Y , so fˆ(P ) =
y is forced. For x ≪ P , with P generated by c, we have x ∈ P , so fˆ(x) =
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f(x) ∈ f [P ] = f [I−[c]] ⊂ I−[f [c]], which is a past component of fˆ(P ); that implies
I−[f [c]] ⊂ I−(fˆ(P )), so fˆ(x) ≪ fˆ(P ). For P ≪ x, with P generated by c, we
have I−[c] ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ x, which implies c ⊂ I−(w) (as in the proof of
Proposition 6); therefore, I−[f [c]] ⊂ I−(f(w)) and f(w) ≪ f(x). With fˆ(P ) the
generalized future limit of f [c], we know that I−[f [c]] is a past component of fˆ(P );
thus, since fˆ(P ) is generalized past-determined, we have fˆ(P ) ≪ f(x) = fˆ(x).
For P ≪ Q, we interpolate P ≪ x ≪ Q. Thus, fˆ is chronological. Generalized
future-continuity follows from that of f , since the only new future limits are those
in ∂ˆ(X).
Next consider fp: For x ≪p y in X , we have I−(x) ⊂ I−(w) for some w ≪ y.
We also have, since X is past-connected, that x is a future limit of some future
chain c, so I−[c] ⊂ I−(w). Thus, I−[f [c]] ⊂ I−(f(w)) and f(w) ≪ f(y). Since
f is generalized future-continuous, f(x) is the generalized future limit of f [c], i.e.,
I−[f [c]] is a past component of f(x). Since f(x) is generalized past-determined,
this gives us f(x) ≪ f(y). Therefore, fp is chronological. For generalized future-
continuity, the proof in Proposition 11 suffices, once we obtain an extension of
Lemma 9, that x is a generalized future limit of a future chain c in Xp if and only
if x is a generalized future limit of any associated chain c′ in X :
With I−[c′] a past component of x inX , we need to have I−p[c] a past component
of x in Xp (the other way being easy). The proof of Lemma 9 shows that I−p[c] ⊂
I−p(x), we just need to show it a maximal IP with that property. Suppose d is a
chain in Xp with I−p[c] ⊂ I−p[d] ⊂ I−p(x); then I−[c′] ⊂ I−[d′] ⊂ I−(x), where
d′ is a chain in X associated to d. Since I−[c′] is maximal with the property of
being an IP contained in the past of x, we have I−[c′] = I−[d′], and it follows that
I−p[c] = I−p[d].
Finally, f+ comes from the previous two constructions, just as in Theorem
14. 
As an example, let us consider the spacetime M formed from L2 by deleting two
timelike half-lines: L0 = {(0, t)|t ≤ 0} and L2 = {(2, t)|t ≥ 2}. Then ∂ˆ(M) consists
of these IPs (illustrated in figure 1): for each t ≤ 0, PLt , bounded by L0 and the
null line from (0, t) going to the left in the past, and PRt , bounded by L0 and the
null line from (0, t) going to the right in the past; for each t > 2, QLt , bounded
by L2, the null line from (2, t) going to the left in the past, and the null line from
(2, 2) going to the right in the past, and QRt , bounded by L2, the null line from
(2, t) going to the right in the past, the null line going from (2, 2) to (0, 0), and L0;
Q2, bounded by the null line from (2, 2) going to the right in the past, the null line
going from (2, 2) to (0, 0), and L0; and the usual future causal boundary for L
2,
consisting of the pasts of null lines going out to future infinity, as well as the entire
spacetime. In Mˆ , we have PR0 ≪ (3, 4) (because Iˆ
−(PR0 ) ⊂ I
−(3, 3)), but there is
no relation between PL0 and (3, 4). Also, since there is no relation between (1, 1)
and (3, 4), the space is not past-determined (same for M). The past-determination
of Mˆ adds some relations: (s, s) ≪p (3, 4) for 0 < s < 2; however, even in Mˆp,
there is no relation between PL0 (or (x, t) for x < 0 and t < x) and (3, 4).
A typical embedding of M to create a boundary for it would be to use Mˆ ,
except to coalesce PR0 and P
L
0 into a point P0, with P0 not related to (3, 4); call
this M¯ . This is not past-determined, since (1, 1) is not related to (3, 4). We
can add relations to M¯ by saying that two points are related if there is a curve
between them, causal in L2, somewhere timelike, allowed to include “one side” of
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L0 or L2 but not to cross either of them (the points P and Q being identified with
one side or the other of those two lines). This space, M¯ , is past-determined, past-
distinguishing, and generalized future-complete (since P0 has two past components,
it is not future-complete); hence we get a generalized future-continuous map from
M+ to M¯ ; this is just the map coalescing PR0 and P
L
0 into P0. Similarly, any means
of adding complete boundaries to the slits in M will end up being a quotient of the
boundaries from Mˆ .
Appendix: An Example with the Full Causal Boundary
Why has the foregoing structure been involved solely with the future chrono-
logical boundary and not with some combination of future and past, such as the
complete causal boundary of the GKP construction? In a nutshell, the reason is
that the combined causal boundary, future with past, is, in general, neither future-
nor past-complete: It’s as if one were to attempt a completion of a Riemannian man-
ifold by adding endpoints to all finite-length endless curves, and then one found, for
instance, that the added endpoints themselves constituted a finite-length endless
curve. Here is an example of how that can happen with the GKP causal boundary
and a rather ordinary spacetime (illustrated in figure 2):
Our spacetimeM will be a subset of Minkowski 2-space, L2, in which we will cut
an infinite number of slits and poke an infinite collection of holes. First we select
three parallel null lines as reference objects, say L+ = {t = x + 1}, L0 = {t = x},
and L− = {t = x − 1}; we also select a future-timelike curve c asymptotic (in the
future) to the middle null line, say c(s) = (sinh s, cosh s). For each positive integer
k, consider a short null segment centered at c(2k), parallel to the reference lines,
say from (sinh(2k)− .5, cosh(2k)− .5) to (sinh(2k) + .5, cosh(2k) + .5); denote the
past and future endpoints of these null segments by, respectively, pk and qk. To
form M , delete from L2 each vertical segment from pk down to L
−, each vertical
segment from qk up to L
+, and each point c(n), all k and all n.
The future causal boundary for M includes an IP Pn corresponding to each of
the deleted points c(n), while the past causal boundary includes an IF Fn for the
same. (The future causal boundary also has, for each of the slits, IPs for each point
of the left and right sides of the slit, except a single IP for the bottom point; an
IP for future timelike infinity, i+; and IPs for future null infinity, ℑ+—but with
points corresponding to the null lines between L− and L+ missing from the usual
ℑ+ for L2, due to the slits. The past causal boundary also has, for each slit, IFs
for each point of the left and right sides, except a single IF for the top; and past
timelike and null infinity, i− and ℑ−. However, we shall be largely unconcerned
with these other points in the causal boundary.) We have each P2k ⊂ P2k+1, so
that within Mˆ , P2k ≪ P2k+1, but no other relations obtain among these boundary
points, due to the slits; and the future chronological completion of M is precisely
the same as adding the GKP future causal boundary to M . Similarly, within Mˇ ,
the past chronological completion of M (the same as adding the GKP past causal
boundary), we have F2k−1 ≪ F2k (since F2k−1 ⊃ F2k) but no other relations among
those particular boundary points.
There is more than one scheme for combining future and past causal boundaries
into a single causal boundary (see, for instance, [S1] and [S2] for a good alternative
to the GKP prescription), but they all agree in a spacetime as simple as this one:
Each Pn is identified with Fn, which we’ll call zn (and the two copies of the left side
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of each slit—the one from the future causal boundary and the one from the past
causal boundary—are identified, and the same with the right sides, with a single
boundary point for the top and one for the bottom of each slit); this is called M∗
in [HE]. Thus, in any choice of chronology relation onM∗ which makes the obvious
mappings from Mˆ and Mˇ to M∗ chronological, we must have z2k−1 ≪ z2k (from
Mˇ) and z2k ≪ z2k+1 (from Mˆ), so that {zn} is a future chain inM∗. However, this
chain has no future limit in M∗—for instance, the past of L0 is not an IP, since the
slits decompose that past into an infinite number of past sets: In essence, the chain
{zn} “escapes” our intended completion of M by aiming for the “hole” in ℑ+ left
by the missing points corresponding to the null lines between L− and L+.
Szabados, in section 6 of [S1], proposes a chronology relation on M∗ that, in
this case, would leave no relations at all among the {zn}; this construction has the
advantage of not adding any additional relations among the points of M—unlike
the GKP construction in the future or past causal boundaries, or the future and
past completions defined here—but the disadvantage of not preserving relations
already defined in Mˆ or Mˇ .
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